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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
permission to use the car is wholly immaterial." Curtis v. Harris et at., 253
S. W. 474, which is in accord with the following: Bolman v. Bulene, 200 S. W.
1068; Llymeln v. Lowe, 239 S. W. 535; Buskin v. Januchowsky (Mo. App.)
218 S. W. 696; Mays v. Fields (Mo. App.) 217 S. W. 589 and Bright v. Thatcher,
202 Mo. App. 501; 215 S. W. 788, all having followed Hays v. Hogan.
It is interesting to note that Becker, J. who concurred in the principal case, re-
versed his own holding in Bright v. Thatcher, supra, wherein he said, "Irre-
spective of the result reached upon the question in other jurisdictions, it is no
longer open to question in this state that the ownership of an automobile pur-
chased by the father for the use and pleasure of himself and family does not
render him liable for damages to a third person injured through the negligence
of a member of his family while operating the automobile in furtherance of that
member's own pleasure, and the fact that the members of the family had the
father's special or general consent to use the car for his pleasure is wholly im-
material," (Italics ours.)
An excellent treatment of the family purpose doctrine in other jurisdictions
can be found in a note that appeared in 11 ST. Louis LAW REVIEW 131. Suffice it
to say, the weight of authority is opposed to this doctrine, and it is also very
interesting to note that there is a distinct geographical division, the western,
central and Pacific states some 17 or 18 in number have been found to favor this
doctrine, while the northwestern and Atlantic states, notably New York, Massa-
chusetts and Pennsylvania, have rejected it. M. W. S., '29.
NEGLIGENCE-PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE-PEDESTRIAN CROSSING STEET IN
MIDDLE OF BLoc.-Plaintiff's decedent received fatal injuries by being struck
by delivery truck driven by defendant's employee. Deceased was at the time
of the accident crossing a heavily travelled thoroughfare in the middle of a
block on a very dark night. Held, deceased though crossing street in middle
of block was presumed in exercise of due care and defendant declared liable for
negligence. Hinchey v. . P. Burroughs & Son, 215 N. W. 346 (Mich., 1927).
Whether in crossing a street in the middle of a block rather than at a treet
intersection plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence is generally held to be
a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Colon v. Bloch, 232 Pac. 486
(Cal.). The courts proceed upon the theory that vehicles have the right of
way except at street intersections, and therefore a pedestrian in crossing a
street in the middle of a block must use greater care for his safety than when
crossing at a place provided for pedestrians. Green v. Ruff in, 125 S. E. 742
(Va.).
The courts have refused consistently to hold that the crossing of a street in
the middle of the block is negligence as a matter of law. They have preferred
to treat the question of negligence in crossing a street both at places of intersec-
tion and at places other than intersections as a question of fact for the jury,
and evidence of the amount of traffic upon the street and of the maximum speed
limit established by ordinance thereon is admitted to enable the jury to ascer-
tain the fact of contributory negligence. Meyer v. Lewis, 43 Mo. App. 417, 1. c.
418; Blackwell v. Remwick, 131 Pac. 94 (Cal.); Heartsell v. Billow, 184 Mo.
App. 420; 171 S. W. 7; Genter v. O'Donoghue, 179 S. W. 732 (Mo. App.).
The Michigan court in presuming that the deceased was in the exercise of due
care when crossing a street in the middle of a block has seemingly transcended
the bounds of the great weight of authority. The question of negligence should
have been submitted to the jury. J. R. B., '28.
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